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SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP  
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP  
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NSC FOR LOOK  
DIA FOR LEA

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TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)

SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):  
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, SEPTEMBER 21, 2009,  
MORNING SESSION

REF: GENEVA 0774 (SFO-GVA-V-007)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States  
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-002.

¶2. (U) Meeting Date: September 21, 2009  
Time: 11:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.  
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY  
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¶3. (S) At the first plenary meeting of the session, the Russian Delegation made verbal presentations on several portions of their draft treaty text which had been provided to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow the previous week (REF A). Russian Delegation members covered the central obligations, central limits, and locations of strategic offense arms (SOAs).

¶4. (S) The Russian Delegation described the Russian view of the work schedule through the end of October; this session would end on October 2 and the next session would begin on October 19. In the interim, the Delegations would return to capitals, but a small group from the U.S. Delegation would go to Moscow to continue our work, both before and during the ministerial in mid-October.

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IMPORTANT CHANGES  
THAT AFFECT OUR WORK  
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15. (S) Antonov summarized two developments he said would positively contribute to the START Follow-on discussions: the meeting of the two Presidents in New York on the margins of the United Nations Security Council meeting and the decision by President Obama on the configuration of U.S. missile defense. On the latter, Antonov said Russian President Medvedev had reacted positively. He said that Russia had asked the U.S. to send missile defense experts to Geneva to brief the Russian Delegation about the decision; A/S Gottemoeller demurred that she would convey the request to Washington but such a briefing would probably not be possible this week in Geneva.

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WORK SCHEDULE  
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16. (S) On the schedule of our work for the upcoming weeks, Antonov stated that the Russian Delegation's assumption was that the current session would last for two weeks, followed by a two-week break in capitals during which a small group from the U.S. Delegation would travel to Moscow just before the mid-October ministerial meeting. Thereafter, Antonov said, the Delegations would return to Geneva on October 19 for two more weeks of talks. At the end of October, he explained, it would be possible to plan beyond November 1st, based on: the progress of the negotiations thusfar,

prospects for settling key issues, the need to return to capitals to study proposals, and the need to continue convening working groups in Geneva. Gottemoeller reiterated that the U.S. saw the need to meet in continuous session in order to complete the treaty by December 5. She asked Antonov to keep an open mind.

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OVERVIEW OF RUSSIAN DRAFT TREATY  
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17. (S) Antonov gave an overview of the Russian approach to preparing its draft treaty text (REF A): it was based on the existing START Treaty, but also incorporated the U.S. concept of a "hybrid" treaty. Moscow had deleted everything that was not needed, assuming relations between the two countries had changed drastically. He highlighted several aspects of the July 6, 2009 Presidential Joint Understanding incorporated into the treaty (legally-binding, reduction period, treaty duration, levels lower than Moscow Treaty) and listed the Russian-proposed central limits of 500 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers; and 1675 warheads. He pointed to elements of special importance, such as each side determining its own force structure, the relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive capabilities, the Russian-proposed ban on non-nuclear weapons on ICBMs or SLBMs, restrictions on basing SOAs outside of national territory, allowance for existing patterns of cooperation, and recognizing the contributions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

18. (S) Antonov noted Moscow wanted the START Follow-on agreement to be a positive example for other states, both nuclear and non-nuclear. Because both of our countries were concerned about the proliferation of missile technology, the United States should understand the tough Russian position on non-nuclear ICBMs. Moscow wanted to be able to explain to other countries with missile capabilities that they needed to show restraint. The treaty should have a deterrent effect. Also, he emphasized, the U.S. and Russia should show leadership on the obligations under Article VI of the NPT.

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MARCH THROUGH THE  
RUSSIAN DRAFT TREATY  
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¶9. (S) General Orlov began a presentation on Articles I and II of the Russian draft. He noted the sides' agreement on the concepts of confidence, predictability, and openness, and then spent several minutes repeating the Russian position about the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive systems. He added that even the new U.S. Triad, which includes missile defenses, demonstrates the link between offensive and defensive capabilities. The Russian Delegation was sorry to see that the United States proposed only referencing the linkage in the preamble; Russia wanted the linkage to be in an operational paragraph of the new treaty (Article I, paragraph 2) to make it legally-binding, especially important with the "changed circumstances" of the new MD decision.

¶10. (S) Orlov further stated if one party built up its capability to intercept strategic missiles, the other side

should have the right to increase its numbers of SOAs, both strategic delivery vehicles and warheads. Such a scenario, he said, could be grounds to "denounce" the treaty.

¶11. (S) Orlov said the Russian position was unchangeable on banning the deployment of ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration. He then read key sentences of the central limits of the Russian draft treaty (Article II, paragraph 1), clarifying on subparagraph (c) that the number included deployed and non-deployed launchers.

- (a) 500, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;
- (b) 1,675, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;
- (c) 600, ICBM and SLBM launchers.

¶12. (S) Orlov commented that the fact that one party had extensive upload capability would allow that party to secretly and quickly achieve a large-scale buildup of its forces. This would impede real reductions and undermine the viability of the treaty. Therefore, Russia had added a new provision on the total number of ICBM and SLBM launchers. The non-deployed number would exclude those launchers in long-term repair or maintenance, but include test launchers, and training launchers in the Russian aggregate limit of 600 ICBM and SLBM launchers. In response to a question, Orlov noted these were only examples of non-deployed launchers.

¶13. (S) General Petrov reviewed Article V of the Russian proposal on locations of SOAs. The Russian text was based on lengthy experience under START, but had been simplified by moving the numerical aspects for types and their respective locations. The technical characteristics of SOAs would also appear in the annex.

- Each Party shall locate strategic offensive arms subject to this treaty only at: ICBM bases, submarine bases, air bases, storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, repair facilities, training facilities, and test ranges.

- Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at test ranges.

- Training launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at ICBM bases and test ranges. Mobile training launchers of ICBMs may, in addition, be located at storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs and at conversion or elimination facilities.

¶14. (S) Petrov pointed out the provision against basing SOA outside national territory in Article V, paragraph 4 to ensure that one Party could not achieve military advantage by bringing SOA closer to the other Party. He then read two additional provisions on heavy bombers:

- In the event of temporary stationing of a heavy bomber outside national territory in accordance with subparagraph 3(b) of Article VIII, notification shall be provided.

- Heavy bombers equipped or converted for non-nuclear armaments shall be based separately from heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

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A FEW U.S. QUESTIONS ON  
THE RUSSIAN DRAFT TREATY  
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¶15. (S) Gottemoeller asked Petrov about how ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers undergoing long-term maintenance would be treated in the memorandum of understanding. Would they be removed from the database or remain listed. Petrov responded that a notification would be provided and that details would be discussed in the working group. (Begin comment: He appeared unable to answer the question. End comment.)

¶16. (S) Siemon asked whether the Russian draft treaty prohibited only nuclear-armed (that is, not non-nuclear) heavy bombers outside national territory. Petrov clarified he meant those actually carrying nuclear weapons, not just nuclear-capable bombers. Warner asked whether the notification requirement would also apply to heavy bombers that had been converted to non-nuclear status. Petrov said it would apply because national technical means could not distinguish nuclear-capable from non-nuclear heavy bombers. Warner observed that once all the B-1Bs had been converted in about a year or two, this would no longer be an issue. Orlov interjected to ask what guarantee there would be that converted heavy bombers would not be able to carry nuclear weapons. Warner offered that this, too, would be discussed in the working group. The Delegations agreed to continue the discussion at the afternoon meeting.

¶17. (U) Documents exchanged: None.

¶18. (U) Participants:

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller  
Amb Ries  
Mr. Brown  
Mr. Buttrick  
Mr. Elliott  
Mr. Evans  
Dr. Fraley  
Col Hartford  
Mr. Johnston  
LTC Leyde  
Mr. Siemon  
Mr. Smith  
Mr. Taylor  
Mr. Trout  
Dr. Warner  
Mrs. Zdravecky  
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov  
Mr. Koshelev  
Mr. Artemyev

Ms. Ivanova  
Mr. Izrazov  
Mr. Kamenskiy  
Ms. Kotkova  
Mr. Leontiev  
Mr. Luchaninov  
Mr. Lysenko

Mr. Malyugin  
Mr. Neshin  
Col Novikov  
Gen Orlov  
Gen Petrov  
Mr. Pischulov  
Gen Poznihir  
Mr. Semin  
Mr. Shevchenko  
Mr. Smirnov  
Mr. Tarasov  
Mr. Vasiliev  
Gen Venevtsev  
Mr. Vorontsov  
Col Zaitsev  
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

119. (U) Gottemoeller sends.  
GRIFFITHS